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What are the important tradeoffs in consulting a single expert for both diagnosis and treatment?  On
one hand, an integrated diagnostician may have the incentive to recommend treatments that are not
in the buyer's best interests.  On the other hand, joint production of diagnosis and treatment by an integrated
diagnostician may be more efficient.  We examine an important special case of this problem:  the costs
and health outcomes of elderly Medicare beneficiaries with coronary artery disease.  We compare
the empirical consequences of diagnosis by an "integrated" cardiologist -- one who can provide surgical
treatment -- to the consequences of diagnosis by a non-integrated cardiologist.  Diagnosis by an integrated
cardiologist leads, on net, to higher health spending but similar health outcomes.  The net effect contains
three components:  reduced spending and improved outcomes from better allocation of patients to
surgical treatment options; increased spending conditional on treatment option; and worse outcomes
from poorer provision of non-surgical care.  We conclude that accounting more completely for doctors'
incentives to refer patients in setting reimbursements, or in the alternative, allowing doctors more freedom
to make and receive payments for referrals, could reduce spending and improve quality.
Christopher C. Afendulis
Department of Health Research and Policy
HRP/Redwood Building
Stanford, University
Stanford, CA  94305-5405
afenduli@stanford.edu
Daniel P. Kessler
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
518 Memorial Way, Room L241
Stanford, CA  94305
and NBER
fkessler@stanford.edu  3 
Introduction 
 
Anyone who has consulted a doctor, plumber, or auto mechanic has experienced 
the tradeoffs in consulting a single expert to both diagnose and treat a problem in the 
presence of asymmetric information.  On one hand, integrated diagnosticians -- those 
who also sell treatments -- may have the incentive to give advice that is not in the buyer's 
best interests.  As the theoretical models in Taylor (1995) and Wolinsky (1993) point out, 
because the buyer has imperfect information on the scope of the problem (if he did not, 
he would not have needed to consult a diagnostician in the first place), the diagnostician 
inevitably has the incentive to recommend treatments that are more profitable, even if 
they are more costly, lower quality, or less appropriate.  On the other hand, joint 
production of diagnosis and treatment may be more efficient.  The diagnostician may 
have better information about how to treat the problem than he could (or would) provide 
to an independent third party.   Or, the diagnostician may be able to treat the problem 
himself less expensively or more effectively ("half the cost is opening the engine block"). 
We examine an important special case of this problem:  the costs and quality of 
care of a random sample of Medicare beneficiaries with coronary artery disease.  We 
compare patients who were diagnosed by an "integrated" cardiologist -- one who also 
provides surgical treatment -- to patients who were diagnosed by a non-integrated 
cardiologist. We decompose the total effect of diagnosis by an integrated cardiologist into 
the parts due to the change in the type of treatment and the parts due to the relative 
efficiency of each type of treatment.  With this information, we quantify the potential 
upsides and downsides to diagnosis by an integrated expert.  We identify these effects 
based on differences across geographic areas in the number of integrated cardiologists per   4 
capita.  Our estimates are consistent under the assumption that unobserved patient 
characteristics and other determinants of spending are similar in across areas with many 
versus few integrated cardiologists; we explore the validity of this assumption below.   
The paper proceeds in four sections.  Section I reviews the previous empirical 
literature on the problems of obtaining diagnosis and treatment from a single expert when 
that expert has better information than the buyer on the source of the buyer's problem.  
Section II discusses the details of the problem that we study and presents our models.  
Section III describes our data.  Section IV presents our results, and Section V concludes 
with the implications of our results for economic theory and health policy. 
 
I.   Empirical Work:  Agency Problems When Diagnosticians Provide Treatment 
  Several recent papers have investigated the extent of moral hazard in integrated 
diagnosticians' advice.  Thomas Hubbard (1998, 2002) analyzes data from the California 
vehicle emissions inspection market, in which inspectors can also provide repairs to help 
vehicles pass.  He finds that vehicle pass rates at small garages are greater than those at 
chain stores and government-owned facilities, holding other factors constant.  He 
concludes that inspectors' desire for repeat business leads them to pass vehicles more 
frequently, and so is sufficient to overcome the potential moral hazard problem in 
integrated diagnosis-repair markets.   
  Other work concludes that expert moral hazard is a more significant market 
failure.  Steve Levitt and Chad Syverson (2005) compare data on sales of homes owned 
by real-estate agents and by non-agents.  They find that agent-owned homes sell for more 
than comparable homes and stay on the market longer, holding all else constant.    5 
Toshiaki Iizuka (2004) studies the Japanese prescription drug market, in which doctors 
not only prescribe drugs but also purchase and dispense them.  He shows that elimination 
of the profit incentive for physician prescriptions would reduce drug expenditures in 
Japan by 14%, holding retail drug prices and other factors constant.   
  Our paper is also related to the long-standing health services literature on 
supplier-induced demand.  These papers, starting with the classic study by Fuchs (1978), 
document the positive correlation across areas between the supply of doctors and the cost 
and intensity of medical care.  However, this literature does not identify the specific 
mechanism causing the observed correlation:  the relationship between density of doctors 
and intensity of care could be due to physicians' moral hazard, to differences in patient 
preferences across areas, or to something else.
1 
Our paper fills many of the gaps in these literatures.  It examines the effects of 
integration in an important but understudied context:  the use of costly and risky imaging 
of people's coronary arteries to detect blockages that, if untreated, can lead to heart 
attacks and other serious health events.  It quantifies the impact of integration on both 
financial and health outcomes, allowing us to make tentative welfare conclusions about 
the integration of diagnosis and treatment.  And, it identifies the mechanisms through 
which integration can have both an upside and a downside for patients under what we 
show to be plausible assumptions.   
 
II.  Integration of Diagnosis and Treatment in Cardiac Care  
                                                 
1 But see Gruber and Owings (1996), who identify the effect of supplier-induced demand by estimating the 
correlation across areas between birth rates and rates of use of cesarean sections.   6 
Diagnostic angiography, also known as catheterization, was invented in 1959 by 
Mason Sones at the Cleveland Clinic.
2  The invention of catheterization, a technique for 
imaging the locations of coronary artery blockages, significantly altered the course of 
modern cardiac care.  Most notably, catheterization was the first step toward the 
invention of a new procedure in the 1970s called percutaneous transluminal coronary 
angioplasty.  Angioplasty uses a surgically-inserted balloon-tipped catheter to clear 
arterial blockages that, if untreated, can lead to serious adverse health events like heart 
attacks.  Prior to the invention of angioplasty, the only surgical treatment for such 
blockages was bypass surgery, which grafts a blood vessel from a patient's leg into his 
chest to improve the flow of blood around the blockage.  Although bypass surgery is 
more appropriate than angioplasty for some patients, it is much more invasive, and so 
results in higher procedural mortality and morbidity.   
In addition to transforming the treatment of arterial blockages, the invention of 
angioplasty transformed the industrial organization of cardiac care.  Prior to angioplasty's 
invention, there were two types of cardiac doctors:  cardiologists, who diagnosed patients 
and offered non-surgical treatment (e.g., prescription drugs); and cardiac surgeons, who 
did not diagnose patients and offered surgical treatment in the form of bypass.  After its 
invention, as summarized in table 1, there were three types of cardiac doctors: non-
interventional, or medical, cardiologists, who diagnosed patients and offered non-surgical 
treatment; cardiac surgeons, who did not diagnose patients and offered surgical treatment 
in the form of bypass; and a new type of "integrated" cardiologist, called an 
interventional cardiologist, who both diagnosed patients and offered surgical treatment in 
the form of angioplasty.   
                                                 
2 This historical narrative is a summary of Mack (2003).   7 
The experiment in this paper is to compare the type of treatment, spending, and 
health outcomes for otherwise similar patients diagnosed by an interventional versus a 
non-interventional cardiologist.  We do this with two statistical models.   
The first model specifies the type of treatment of patient j = 1,…,N as a function 
of the patient's personal characteristics Xj (age, gender, black/nonblack race, specific 
diagnosis, and illness severity at the time of the diagnosis) and the characteristics of the 
patient's hospital and diagnosing cardiologist.  If the patient is initially diagnosed by an 
interventional cardiologist, then Ij  = 1; otherwise, Ij  = 0.   In addition, the diagnosing 
cardiologist and hospital of diagnosis have other characteristics Zj.   
Cardiologists offer one of three treatment recommendations:  angioplasty 
(denoted by an indicator variable Aj = 1), bypass surgery (denoted by an indicator 
variable Bj = 1), or drugs and other non-surgical care (denoted by an indicator variable Cj 
= 1).   
We specify treatment choice as a multinomial logit function, i.e.,  
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where Yj is total spending or health outcome in the year after diagnosis, and E(￿ | …) = 0.   8 
The main concern with multinomial logit estimates of ￿ and OLS estimates of 
(￿,￿) is selection bias -- unobserved differences in the health or preferences of patients 
treated by an interventional versus a non-interventional cardiologist.   For example, a 
patient with characteristics X diagnosed by an interventional cardiologist and hospital 
with characteristics Z may be sicker than an observably identical patient diagnosed by an 
observably identical non-interventional cardiologist at an observably identical hospital, 
which could lead him to have different treatments, spending, and health outcomes even in 
the absence of a causal effect.  To address this concern, we estimate the treatment type 
equations with a two-stage method that substitutes the predicted values of I and Z for the 
actual values, using each patient's three-digit-zip-code average level of I and Z as 
excluded instruments (standard errors are calculated using the bootstrap method, 
sampling with replacement 100 times).  We estimate the spending and health outcome 
models by instrumental variables, again using each patient's three-digit-zip-code average 
level of I and Z as excluded instruments (with heteroscedasticty-robust standard errors).  
To the extent that there are no differences across areas in the unobserved determinants of 
patients’ health spending or health status that are correlated with the area density of types 
of cardiologist or hospital, estimates of the effect of I versus N from this model will be 
consistent.
3  We investigate the validity of this assumption below. 
 
III.  Data 
We examine a 20% random sample of all patients who received a diagnostic 
catheterization in 1998, in either an inpatient or outpatient setting.  We restrict our sample 
                                                 
3 To the extent that there are spillover effects of interventional cardiologists in an area -- that is, the 
presence of interventional cardiologists affects the treatment decisions of non-interventional cardiologists -- 
estimates from the area effects models will be consistent for the sum of the direct and the spillover effects.   9 
to patients who were enrolled in fee-for-service Medicare continuously for the 365 days 
preceding and the 365 days following their catheterization.  We identify the doctor who 
performed each patient’s catheterization in our study period using physician claims data.  
We classify each patient’s diagnosing doctor (also using physician claims data) as 
interventional if the doctor billed Medicare for any angioplasties in 1998 or 1999 or non-
interventional if the doctor billed Medicare for neither angioplasty nor bypass in 1998 or 
1999.  We delete the handful of patients were diagnosed by a cardiac surgeon (i.e., if the 
doctor billed Medicare for a bypass surgery in 1998 or 1999).   
We calculate the following patient characteristics X from these longitudinal 
claims data:  three sets of 32 indicator variables to capture all of the patients' ICD-9 
diagnoses at the time of his catheterization, at his most recent past acute care hospital 
admission in the preceding 365 days (if any), and at his most recent past non-acute care 
hospital admission in the preceding 365 days (if any); the total number of days in the 
acute-care and non-acute care hospital in the preceding 365 days; the total Medicare 
expenditures on acute-care and non-acute-care hospital services in the preceding 365 
days; and age, gender, and race.  We calculate the following physician and hospital 
characteristics Z: catheterization volume of the diagnosing cardiologist; angioplasty or 
bypass-surgery volume of the treatment physician (if any); catheterization volume of the 
hospital at which the test occurred; angioplasty or bypass volume of the hospital at which 
the treatment occurred; and the size (number of beds) and system, teaching, and for-
profit/nonprofit status of the hospital at which the diagnosis occurred.  To identify the 
cost consequences of these differences in treatment paths, we calculated the total 
Medicare hospital and physician spending (including all deductibles and copayments)   10 
incurred by each patient in the 365 days following his diagnosis.   To identify the 
outcome consequences, we calculated the rate of readmission for heart failure (HF) and 
heart attack (AMI) in the 365 days following the diagnosis (excluding readmissions 
within the first 30 days, because they may be associated with the initial diagnostic 
process), and the mortality rate in the 365 days following the diagnosis. 
  Table 2 investigates the validity of the key assumptions necessary to identify the 
causal effects of diagnosis by an interventional cardiologist.  The first column of the table 
presents descriptive statistics for the half of the sample of patients from areas with a high 
density of interventional cardiologists; the second column presents statistics for the other 
half of the sample.  The first row shows that the probability of diagnosis by an 
interventional cardiologist is strongly correlated with the area density of interventional 
cardiologists.  Patients from areas with many interventional cardiologists are 21.5 
percentage points more likely to be diagnosed by an interventional cardiologist, around 
25 percent more likely.   
  However, there is little evidence that these areas differ in terms of patients' health 
status in the year before diagnosis with cardiac illness.  According to the second and third 
rows, patients from high-density areas spend fractionally fewer days in the hospital and 
$62 less on hospital care in total, with neither difference statistically significant.  Thus, 
unobserved heterogeneity across areas in patient health is unlikely to bias our estimates 
of the effect of diagnosis by an interventional cardiologist. 
  According to the fourth row, patients from high-density areas spend $578 less on 
all Medicare covered services in the year after diagnosis, which is statistically significant 
at conventional levels.  This suggests that unobserved heterogeneity across areas in other   11 
factors such as patients' taste for intensive medical treatment would, if anything, lead to a 
downward bias in our estimates of the effect of diagnosis by an interventional 
cardiologist on the cost of care in the year after diagnosis.  The usual omitted variable 
problem in studies of supplier-induced demand is that areas with a greater number of 
physicians or specialists have higher health spending overall; but, in our experiment, the 
opposite is true. 
 
IV.    Results 
Table 3 presents the effects of diagnosis by an interventional versus a non-
interventional cardiologist on Medicare-covered spending and health outcomes in the 
year after diagnosis.  The table has three panels.  The top panel of the table presents the 
aggregate effects, E(Y | I=1) - E(Y | I =0).  The leftmost four columns present the raw 
difference in means; the rightmost four columns present the difference, adjusted for 
selection and the characteristics of patients, doctors, and hospitals.  The top panel shows 
that treatment by an interventional cardiologist leads to significantly higher spending in 
the year after diagnosis, but statistically indistinguishable health outcomes.  Adjusted for 
selection and differences in characteristics, patients diagnosed by an interventional 
cardiologist experienced $2,847 higher spending (standard error $747), about 10% 
greater than average (from table 2, average spending is $28,553 = ($28,264 + $28,842) / 
2).  However, the effect of diagnosis by an interventional cardiologist has no significant 
effect on health outcomes.  These estimates are unlikely to be due to unobserved 
differences across areas in demand or patient preferences.  According to table 2, omitted   12 
variable bias should if anything lead to underestimation of any positive gap in spending 
between interventional cardiologists and non-interventional cardiologists.  
The total effect of diagnosis by an interventional cardiologist consists of several 
opposing component parts.  The second and third panels of table 2 decompose the total 
effect into five factors.
4  The first group of factors includes two that are due to the 
redirection of patients who would have otherwise received bypass or non-surgical 
treatment by interventional cardiologists into the treatment they provide -- angioplasty.
5   
The second and third rows of the table show that the redirection of bypass patients to 
angioplasty results in significant spending reductions of $1,024 per patient; the 
redirection of non-surgical patients results in significant spending increases of $535 per 
patient.  This is not surprising, given the average subsequent-year spending (unadjusted 
for selection or characteristics) by type of treatment is $49,222 for bypass patients, 
$29,681 for angioplasty patients, and $18,569 for non-surgical patients (not published in 
any table).  The redirection of patients to angioplasty has a small but significant adverse 
effect on health outcomes, leading to increases in readmission with AMI in the 31-365 
days following diagnosis of approximately a tenth of a percentage point (on a base of 2 
percentage points, not published in any table).   
Perhaps more surprising are the effects of the second group of factors, those due 
to interventional cardiologists' relative efficiency in managing patients with each type of 
treatment.  According to the fourth row, diagnosis by an interventional cardiologist leads 
                                                 
4 We derive this decomposition in an appendix. 
5 The following table presents the probability of each type of treatment by type of diagnosing cardiologist: 
        Interventional Cardiologist  Non-interventional Cardiologist 
Treatment A:  angioplasty     0.303        0.226 
Treatment B:  bypass      0.217        0.240 
Treatment C:  non-surgical    0.479        0.534 
   13 
to significantly higher spending on angioplasty patients ($1,179, standard error $327) 
with no improvement in health outcomes.  According to the fifth row, diagnosis by an 
interventional cardiologist also leads to much higher spending on bypass patients 
($1,744, standard error $461), but dramatically lower mortality (1.195 percentage points, 
standard error 0.517).  On a base of one-year mortality of 10.5 percentage points (not 
published in any table), this amounts to more than 10%.  According to the sixth row, 
diagnosis by an interventional cardiologist leads to statistically indistinguishable 
increases in spending on non-surgical patients, but dramatically higher mortality (0.889 
percentage points, standard error 0.560; significant at the 10 percent level). 
 
V.  Conclusions 
What are the important tradeoffs from integrating diagnosis and treatment in the 
presence of asymmetric information?   Economic theory suggests two opposing effects.  
Diagnosticians who sell treatment may give advice that is not in the buyer's best interests, 
but joint production of diagnosis and treatment may be more efficient. Despite the 
obvious importance of this question, and its prevalence in a wide range of markets other 
than health care, little empirical work has examined integration's effects. 
This paper examines the treatments, health spending, and health outcomes of 
elderly Medicare beneficiaries with a common form of coronary artery disease.  We 
compare beneficiaries who were diagnosed by a cardiologist who provides integrated 
diagnosis and surgical treatment (a.k.a. an interventional cardiologist) to those diagnosed 
by a cardiologist who is not integrated (a.k.a. a non-interventional, or medical,   14 
cardiologist).  We find, on net, that diagnosis by an interventional cardiologist leads to 
increases in health spending of approximately 10 percent, but not better health outcomes.   
This aggregate effect masks several important, opposing components.  First is the 
unsurprising moral hazard effect:  diagnosis by an interventional cardiologist leads to 
significantly more angioplasties -- the surgical treatment that interventional cardiologists 
provide.  However, because several of the new angioplasty patients used to receive (much 
more costly) bypass surgery, the extra angioplasties lead to slightly lower health spending 
overall -- approximately $500, or around 2 percent -- and small but statistically 
significant increases in adverse health outcomes.   
The effects due to interventional cardiologists' relative efficiency in managing 
patients with each type of treatment are more surprising.  Interventional cardiologists do 
not manage angioplasty patients more efficiently; angioplasty patients diagnosed by an 
interventional cardiologist have higher spending and about the same health outcomes.  
The big advantage to diagnosis by an interventional cardiologist accrues to patients who 
are treated with bypass surgery by a cardiac surgeon.  These patients have significantly 
higher health spending and dramatically lower mortality rates.  This could be due to 
interventional cardiologists' sorting patients into bypass surgery or allocating patients to 
cardiac surgeons more effectively.  The big disadvantage to diagnosis by an 
interventional cardiologist accrues to patients who are treated non-surgically; these 
patients have significantly higher mortality.  This could be due to interventional 
cardiologists' lack of ability or incentives to treat non-surgical patients effectively.   
Our results point out an important inconsistency in Medicare reimbursement 
policy, and indeed an important general problem in contracting in the presence of   15 
asymmetric information.  Explicit "kickback" payments from treating to diagnosing 
doctors are banned by law (for public purchasers such as Medicare and Medicaid) and by 
contract (for private purchasers like insurance companies and large employers).  
However, the principle underlying this ban is not generally applied to doctors' decision to 
provide integrated diagnosis and treatment, even though integration can have the same 
effects on incentives and behavior as kickbacks do.  In addition, allowing integration but 
banning kickbacks effectively allows rent capture by integrated but not non-integrated 
doctors, which can distort treatment decisions even further.
6 
How should these incentive problems be resolved?  A blanket ban on the 
integration of diagnosis and treatment would be completely impractical.  Every doctor 
provides both diagnosis and therapeutic services; interventional cardiologists are only one 
example.  Thus, we conclude that paying integrated doctors differently, or allowing 
doctors more freedom to make and receive payments for referrals, could reduce cost and 
improve quality.   
For example, our results suggest that interventional cardiologists' important 
strength may be more in the triaging of surgically-treated patients than in the provision of 
angioplasty.  If further research finds this to be true, then paying interventional 
cardiologists more for diagnosis and less for treatment could help reduce spending and 
improve outcomes.  Our results also suggest that interventional cardiologists' important 
weakness may be in the management of non-surgical patients.  If further research finds 
this to be true, then paying interventional cardiologists to refer patients to non-
interventional cardiologists for non-surgical treatment, or allowing non-interventional 
cardiologists to pay for referrals, could also improve productivity in health care.   
                                                 
6 See Pauly (1979) for a detailed discussion of the welfare effects of kickbacks in health care.   16 
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Appendix:  Derivation of Decomposition 
 
The expected difference in medical expenditures or health outcomes for a patient 
diagnosed by an interventional versus a non-interventional cardiologist can be written as 
the difference between the sums of the products of the probabilities of each type of 
treatment (A:  Angioplasty; B:  bypass; C:  non-surgical) and the expected outcome 
conditional on treatment (subscripts and conditioning on X and Z are suppressed for 
simplicity in notation): 
(1)  E(Y | I=1) – E(Y | I=0) = Pr(A | I=1)*E(Y | I=1, A) – Pr(A | I=0)*E(Y | I=0, A) 
      + Pr(B | I=1)*E(Y | I=1, B) – Pr(B | I=0)*E(Y | I=0, B) 
      + Pr(C | I=1)*E(Y | I=1, C) – Pr(C | I=0)*E(Y | I=0, C) 
 
But because a patient must always receive some treatment (1 = Pr(A | I=1) + Pr(B | I=1) + 
Pr(C | I=1) = Pr(A | I=0) + Pr(B | I=0) + Pr(C | I=0)), the expected difference in 
utilization or outcomes can be written as the sum of five components: 
(2)  E(Y | I) – E(Y | I=0) = [Pr(B | I=0) – Pr(B | I=1)] * [E(Y | I=1, A) – E(Y | I=1, B)] 
      + [Pr(C | I=0) – Pr(C | I=1)] * [E(Y | I=1, A) – E(Y | I=1, C)] 
+ Pr(A | I=0) * [(E(Y | I=1, A) – E(Y | I=0, A)] 
+ Pr(B | I=0) * [(E(Y | I=1, B) – E(Y | I=0, B)] 
      + Pr(C | I=0) * [(E(Y | I=1, C) – E(Y | I=0, C)] 
 
As long as interventional cardiologists are less likely than non-interventional 
cardiologists to treat patients non-surgically and with bypass, the first term of this 
decomposition can be interpreted as the portion of the expected difference in utilization 
or outcomes due to the redirection of bypass patients to angioplasty; the second term as 
the portion due to the redirection of non-surgical patients to angioplasty; the third term as 
the portion due to the difference in utilization or outcomes of angioplasty patients 
diagnosed by an interventional cardiologist; the fourth term as the portion due to the 
difference in utilization or outcomes of bypass patients diagnosed an interventional 
cardiologist; and the fifth term as the portion due to the difference in utilization or 
outcomes of non-surgical patients diagnosed by an interventional cardiologist.   
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Table 1:  Types of Cardiac Doctors and the Services That They Provide 






cardiologists  Cardiac surgeons          
                    
Diagnostic services  Catheterization  Catheterization  None          
                    
Treatment services  Non-surgical   Non-surgical  Surgical: bypass          
      Surgical: angioplasty             
                    
                    
                    
Table 2:  Diagnosing Cardiologist, Health Status at Diagnosis, and Subsequent Spending    
 of Patients in Areas with High and Low Numbers of Inteventional Cardiologists    
                    








cardiologists  Difference          
                    
Probability of diagnosis                    
by interventional cardiologist  0.870  0.655  0.215**          
                    
Number of days in hospital in                   
in year before diagnosis  2.94  2.98  -0.04          
                    
Hospital spending                   
in year before diagnosis  $3,925  $3,987  -$62          
                    
Total spending                   
in year after diagnosis  $28,264  $28,842  -$578**          
                    
Number of patients  53244  53103             
                    
** significant at the 5% level.                   
                     
Table 3:  Effect of Diagnosis by Interventional versus Non-interventional Cardiologist 
on Health Spending and Health Outcomes in the Year After Diagnosis 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
        
Raw Differences Between Patients Diagnosed by 
Interventional versus Non-interventional Cardiologists 
Differences Controlling for Patient, Doctor, Hospital, and 
Selection 
Spending  AMI Readmit  HF readmit  Mortality  Spending  AMI readmit  HF readmit  Mortality 
                       
I.  Total effect        
1.  E(Y | I=1) – E(Y | I=0)       
$216  0.166%  0.219%  0.910%  $2,847  0.393%  0.584%  -0.463% 
            ($747)  (0.428%)  (0.840%)  (0.861%) 
                       
II.  Portion due to type of treatment             
2.  Portion due to the redirection of bypass patients to angioplasty       
[Pr(B | I=0) – Pr(B | I=1)] * [E(Y | I=1, A) – E(Y | I=1 , B)]       
-$445  0.041%  -0.032%  -0.052%  -$1,024  0.175%  0.060%  -0.057% 
            ($172)  (0.069%)  (0.115%)  (0.118%) 
3. Portion due to the redirection of non-surgical patients to angioplasty       
[Pr(C | I=0) – Pr(C | I=1)] * [E(Y | I=1, A) – E(Y | I=1, C)]       
$577  0.107%  -0.032%  -0.112%  $535  0.123%  0.018%  -0.040% 
            ($173)  (0.049%)  (0.043%)  (0.045%) 
                       
III.  Portion conditional on type of treatment 
4.  Angioplasty                   
Pr(A | I=0) * [(E(Y | I=1, A) – E(Y | I=0, A)]       
-$398  0.035%  -0.040%  0.371%  $1,179  0.259%  -0.173%  -0.059% 
            ($327)  (0.255%)  (0.392%)  (0.392%) 
5.  Bypass surgery       
Pr(B | I=0) * [(E(Y | I=1, B) – E(Y | I=0, B)]       
-$27  0.000%  -0.046%  0.009%  $1,744  -0.047%  0.600%  -1.195% 
            ($461)  (0.232%)  (0.500%)  (0.517%) 
6.  Non-surgical treatment       
Pr(C | I=0) * [(E(Y | I=1, C) – E(Y | I=0, C)]       
$510  -0.017%  0.369%  0.694%  $414  -0.116%  0.079%  0.889% 
            ($415)  (0.269%)  (0.527%)  (0.560%) 
                       